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Six experiments test how accessible anthropomorphic concepts affect thoughts and 
feelings about a variety of different objects (robots, vehicles and computers). Across these 
studies, people induced to think about objects in anthropomorphic terms (i) give less weight to 
product quality when making purchase and replacement decisions. Instead, they (ii) attend to 
features usually considered relevant in the interpersonal domain (such as neonatal features or 
connotations of “warmth”). Additionally, (iii) although people do not prefer new 
anthropomorphic products over non-anthropomorphized objects, they are generally more 
reluctant to replace anthropomorphized products that they already own, especially if they have an 
anxious interpersonal attachment style. Finally, (iv) people report experiencing more 
interpersonal emotions such as love and anger when thinking about anthropomorphized objects 
than when thinking about non-anthropomorphized objects. These effects occur even when the 
anthropomorphic cues are trivial and embedded within survey questions rather than a property of 
the object of judgment. Together these findings suggest that the categories of “human” and 
“nonhuman” are malleable and that social cognitive processes to be applied to objects, with 






 From a distanced perspective, most people would agree that the world is clearly 
divided into the categories of ―living‖ and ―nonliving,‖ with very few cases where a 
target‘s ontological status is a matter of serious debate (e.g. viruses). However, in 
practice there is a degree of malleability to these categories, as demonstrated by cross-
cultural differences in what is consensually ―human‖ and ―not-human.‖ Animist cultures 
may view certain natural objects as possessing agency, while some subcultures in 
industrialized societies imbue technological artifacts (e.g. ships) with agentic properties 
(Guthrie, 1993). Further people will sometimes reason about nonliving objects in 
anthropomorphic terms even when they objectively know that they are not alive (e.g. 
ghosts; Bering, 2006) or that they are purely symbolic entities (e.g. brands; Aaker, 1997) 
if doing so assists in parsimoniously explaining or communicating their properties. 
Reflecting the tendency, anthropomorphic objects are commonly featured in movies and 
books intended for both children (e.g., The Brave Little Toaster, Disch, 1987) and adults 
(e.g., 2001: A Space Odyssey, Kubrick, 1968). 
 Within individuals there is also variation in whether or not specific objects are 
anthropomorphized, depending on the presence of contextual cues that imply agency and 
the accessibility of socially relevant goals. Further, people sometimes treat objects as if 
they possess agency, even if they do not explicitly represent them in anthropomorphic 
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terms. Most of us at some point have argued (or pled) with a computer, felt attached to a 
favorite sweater or expressed love for a new car without much thought about the 
underlying anthropomorphic assumptions implied by these actions. Although contextual 
cues are important in almost all domains of thought, people may be especially sensitive to 
cues that imply the presences of other agents. Chapter Two briefly reviews the features 
that lead to rapid agent detection.   
People apply specialized knowledge structures when reasoning about other 
people, acquire vast repertoires of information relevant to social situations and devote 
substantial energy to monitoring and communicating socially relevant information. 
People‘s reasoning about other agents is essentially egocentric (Ames, 2004). Although 
this tendency decreases as organisms become less similar to humans (Eddy, Gallup & 
Povinelli, 1993) people may still rely on their knowledge of human behavior as a starting 
point when reasoning about objects, resulting in qualitative differences in how people 
treat anthropomorphized and non-anthropomorphized objects. Chapter Three briefly 
outlines some of the previously identified consequences of anthropomorphic thought 
already identified through empirical research.   
Anthropomorphizing an object shifts attention to features that are relevant when 
thinking about other agents at the expense of concerns that are typically relevant to 
objects. Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven consistently demonstrate this general 
principle with a variety of novel and familiar objects and a variety of techniques used to 
activate agentic concepts. These studies extend previous work by using an experimental 
approach in which the accessibility of anthropomorphic thoughts is experimentally 
manipulated while holding the object constant and by demonstrating that 
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anthropomorphic cues influence not only what information people attend to, but also 
which information they ignore.  
A second consequence is that interpersonally relevant feelings should influence 
decisions about anthropomorphized objects. Thus, people should also be reluctant to 
replace anthropomorphized objects as I demonstrate throughout this research. Chapter 
Eight highlights this by demonstrating that people who are chronically concerned about 
rejection are especially reluctant to replace objects following an anthropomorphic prime 
and also tend to express feelings of love towards anthropomorphized objects. However, 
interpersonal emotions are not always positive. Chapter Nine highlights the potential 
tradeoffs of anthropomorphism by demonstrating that people experience more anger after 
thinking of an anthropomorphized object that has failed them. Although the effects of 
anthropomorphic thinking are of relevance to a variety of different domains including 
politics, the economy and religion and have been studied using a variety of methods, 
these issues will be explored within the domain of consumer behavior using an 
experimental approach.  
Novel Contributions  
Taken together these findings suggest that people do not automatically and 
consistently anthropomorphize objects (as implied by correlational research, e.g. Aaker 
1997; Moon & Nass 1996) but rather that people are sensitive to agentic cues. When 
these cues are present - either in the design of the object itself or in the mind of the 
perceiver - the likelihood that social-cognitive knowledge structures will be applied to 
objects increases. Together these findings demonstrate that the categories of ―living‖ and 
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―nonliving‖ are fundamentally different yet malleable. They are fundamentally different 
in terms of the information that people attend to and the consequences of this information 
on thoughts and feelings. At the same time, they are malleable in that there is not 
necessarily consensus on what should be (implicitly) anthropomorphized and even trivial 
situational cues appear to influence how an object is categorized. Thus although 
cognition may often be domain-specific, the domain to which a target belongs may lie in 
the eye of the beholder.  





Causes of Anthropomorphism 
 
Agency is a concept that provides causal explanations and predictions about a 
target of judgment rather than an ontological category in its own right. Mental attributes 
such as intentions, beliefs and desires are central to predicting the behavior of living 
agents yet not directly observable within any target except perhaps the self (Kirk & 
Squires, 1974). Instead their presence is inferred based on other observable properties of 
the target. As a result, what does and does not experience mental states is at best an 
educated guess.  
 Determining what is alive is an important task when forming a model of the 
environment and predicting future events because whether a target is living or not is 
central to determining the appropriate set of responses towards it. As a result, people are 
sensitive to cues that signal potential agency and readily apply knowledge about agents – 
often human agents - to any targets of judgment that could potentially be alive (Bering, 
2006). Current conceptualizations of anthropomorphism identify three determinants of 
anthropomorphic thought: elicited agent knowledge, sociality motivation and effectance 
motivation (Epley, Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007). Elicited agent knowledge refers to features 
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of the stimulus that suggest that it is alive and includes both behavioral evidence that an 
object is living and superficial resemblance to known living kinds. Sociality motivation 
refers to people‘s desire to be around others, leading to vigilance for agents that can 
potentially fulfill this motivation. Effectance motivation refers to people‘s desire to 
understand their environments. As an individual difference, this is a somewhat messy 
variable as the prediction of the environment is central to most, if not all, 
anthropomorphic thought. However, individuals who are especially high in their need to 
understand their environment seem to be especially likely to endorse anthropomorphic 
beliefs for unexplained behavior (Epley, Waytz, Akalis & Cacioppo, 2008).  
Dynamic aspects of objects  
Past behavior is a good predictor of future behavior. Thus, the appearance of 
agentic ―behavior‖ is the most diagnostic cue of future agentic acts. Motion (or "dynamic 
aspects‖ Gelman & Opfer, 2002) intuitively requires a cause and in the absence of 
external physical forces, internal forces (such as desires) can provide an explanation for 
an object‘s movements. Thus autonomous motion can imply agency. When objects that 
should not have agency demonstrate agentic behavior the apparent contradiction must be 
resolved. Poulin-Dubois, Lepage, and Ferland (1996) found that nine month old infants 
paid more attention and experienced more negative affect when inanimate objects moved 
and responded to verbal commands than when people did. The authors interpret this 
finding as demonstrating that infants are aware of what is and is not ―supposed‖ to be 
alive and attend to apparent violations of this rule.  
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Motion remains an important cue of agency through the lifespan. Heider and 
Simmel (1944) demonstrated that adults spontaneously anthropomorphized moving 
shapes, invoking agentic concepts (i.e. intentions, beliefs and desires) to explain their 
movements (―the square desired to be friends with the circle‖). Highlighting the 
importance of apparent motion, follow up experiments found that people will use agentic 
descriptions even when the video is highly pixilated to disrupt the continuity of the 
shapes themselves while preserving residual movement (Berry, Misovich, Kean & 
Barron, 1992). Similarly, people will ascribe agency to the actions of non-agentic entities 
(i.e. plants) when their movements are accelerated to more closely approximate the speed 
at which agents typically move (Morewedge, Preston & Wegener, 2007).  
Although agentic concepts can, in principle, explain the actions of any target, they 
are most readily applied when the object‘s motion fits closely with preexisting 
conceptions of agentic behavior (Woodward, 1999; Opfer, 2002; Opfer and Siegler, 
2004). Opfer (2002) showed children of various ages and adults animated blobs moving 
either aimlessly or towards a ―goal‖ (another amorphous blob). People of all ages were 
more likely to attribute agency to goal-directed blobs and were more likely than chance to 
infer that they had additional psychological and biological properties. This suggests that 
although motion that does not fit with other explanatory frameworks may lead people to 
resort to anthropomorphic explanations (which can explain just about any behavior), 
people are especially likely to do so when the pattern of motion fits with naïve 




Featural aspects of objects  
People also need to be able to identify whether a target has agency in the absence 
of any prior behavior, drawing upon the target‘s appearance alone (―featural aspects‖ 
Gelman & Opfer, 2002). Since detecting the presence of agents quickly is important than 
and false positives during agent detection (e.g. seeing faces in rocks and trees) have 
minimal consequences compared to false negatives (failing to perceive a predator or 
rival; Guthrie, 1993) people will readily infer agency, even when there is little behavioral 
justification for doing so (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004).  
Faces are detected especially rapidly and with little effort relative to other objects 
(Purcell & Stewart, 1986) and this difference emerges shortly after birth (for a review see 
Liu & Chaudhuri, 2003). As a result, features that have even a passing resemblance to the 
human form such as symbolic ―eyes‖ (Jones, Smith & Landau, 1991; Haley & Fessler, 
2005; Jipson & Gelman, 2007) are readily anthropomorphized. Jones and colleagues 
(1991) found that children classified objects according to shape and not texture. 
However, when eyes were added to the objects, children classified them according to 
texture rather than shape. They explain this finding by noting that children know that 
texture tends to remain the same for living objects while they can change shape over both 
the short term (i.e. postural change, Becker & Ward, 1991) and the long term (i.e. 
growth; Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish & McCormick, 1991). The presence of symbolic 
eyes also leads children to make different inferences. Jipson & Gellman (2007) found that 
children were more likely to attribute biological properties to objects that had a face but 
were not alive (such as a robot) and occasionally failed to attribute biological properties 
to living objects that did not have a face (such as a starfish).   
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Other features that correlate with agentic behavior such as human-like forms, 
(Agarwal & McGill, 2007; Trampe, Stapel & Siero, 2007) or specific body parts, such as 
hands (Woodward, 1999) can elicit responses similar to those elicited by symbolic eyes. 
For example, Trampe and colleagues (2007) found that people dissatisfied with their 
bodies spontaneously compared themselves against illustrations of vases, evaluating 
themselves more negatively after viewing a thin vase than after viewing a wide vase.   
Folk psychological theories are sufficiently complex that they can provide an 
explanation for virtually any behavior, making it difficult to disconfirm agentic beliefs 
about a target. Furthermore, since we experience mental states as ―always on‖ even in the 
absence of perception or physical action, once we ascribe agency to a target, it may 
persist, even in the face of evidence suggesting that it is not alive. For example, Bering 
and Bjorklund (2004) asked children to imagine a mouse eaten by an alligator. They 
found that children understood that the mouse could no longer experience physical 
sensations, but they were far less likely to believe that the mouse could no longer think 
(Bering & Bjorklund, 2004). Likewise, when asked what characteristics were present or 
absent within a dead agent, adults took longer to make inferences about purely mental 
states than biological states (Bering, 2002). Thus agentic beliefs triggered by 
anthropomorphic cues are likely to persist in the face of ambiguous or even 
disconfirming evidence.   
Perceiver characteristics 
Features of the perceiver can also influence the likelihood that they will perceive 
agency. Consistent with goal-directed accounts of cognition (Fishbach & Ferguson, 
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2007), affiliation goals increase sensitivity to social cues (Gardener, Pickett, Jefferis & 
Knowles, 2007). Consequently, feelings of loneliness or isolation can make people more 
sensitive to the presence of other agents in the environment. Chronically lonely people 
are more likely to endorse anthropomorphic beliefs about objects and animals (Epley, 
Akalis, Waytz & Cacioppo, 2008) although at least among children, anthropomorphism 
does not necessarily predict social maladjustment or isolation (Gleason, 2004). Likewise, 
people primed to think of social isolation are more likely to select adjectives related to 
social support when describing their pets, suggesting that people may strategically 
emphasize anthropomorphic characteristics of targets that fulfill social needs.  
Similarly, competency goals lead people to perceive illusory patterns in randomly 
occurring stimuli (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Agentic beliefs provide meaning to 
otherwise inexplicable events. Thus, people who are chronically high in the need for 
control are especially likely to believe in god or other supernatural agents (Sales, 1972) 
and are more willing to ascribe agentic traits to animals (Epley, Waytz, Akalis & 
Cacioppo, 2008).  
Ecologically diagnostic cues of agency have been the primary focus of study for 
researchers interested not only in the causes of anthropomorphism, but also the 
consequences of anthropomorphic thought. Indeed, many studies examine both potential 
causes and consequences simultaneously. The manipulation of ecological features of an 
object is essential for understanding the causes of agent detection, but problematic for 
understanding the consequences of inferring agency for reasons that will be discussed 
below. However, even though there are specialized neural pathways for the processing of 
perceptual inputs relevant to agent detection (Liu & Chaudhuri, 2003) and for processing 
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downstream inferences about agents (Ermer et al., 2006) the general principles by which 
agentic concepts are rendered accessible as outlined above is consistent with more 
general knowledge accessibility models (for a review see Higgins, 1996). This suggests 
that anthropomorphic beliefs about objects could also be manipulated using semantic 
primes rather than manipulating the features intrinsic to the object as is typically done in 






Consequences of Anthropomorpism 
 
Most of our knowledge about other agents is either drawn from our experience 
with our own mental states, or our observations of the behavior of other people. Thus, 
agentic beliefs about targets are always implicitly, and sometimes explicitly 
anthropomorphic. As a result, thinking of objects as alive typically equates to thinking of 
objects as if they were human. When thinking about objects and people, there are 
important differences in the processing of information, both at a neural level (Mitchell, 
Heatherton & Macrae, 2002; Yoon, Gutchess, Feinberg & Polk, 2006) and in self-report 
and behavioral measures (e.g. Cosmides, 1989). Thus whether a target is categorized as 
living has consequences for what information comes to mind and what predictions seem 
plausible when thinking about the target. The speed at which agents are detected in the 
environment and the ease with which anthropomorphic concepts are applied suggests that 
this process can occur more or less automatically, and does not require that people 
explicitly endorse that the object is alive.  
Object perception as person perception 
A great deal of correlational and quasi-experimental research supports the general 
prediction that people reason about anthropomorphized objects as if they are people.  
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Heider and Simmel (1944) noted that people used knowledge about social categories 
when describing shapes by making appeals to gender and relational schemas as a part of 
their explanations. Subsequent studies suggest that social cognitive processes and 
preexisting social knowledge can also influence the evaluation of objects. For example, 
products packaged together are usually expected to be of identical size; however, when 
thinking in terms of products in terms of ―product families‖ people tend to prefer objects 
of different sizes that are packaged as a single unit over objects of identical size (Agarwal 
& McGill, 2007). Likewise, people rated a computerized ―tutor‖ with a male voice to be 
more informative than a computerized tutor with a female voice when the topic of study 
was computers while the reverse was true when the topic of study was relationships 
(Nass, Moon & Green 1997).  
Further evidence for anthropomorphic thought comes from studies that observe 
parallels between the characteristics people attend to when evaluating other people and 
the characteristics people attend to when evaluating objects. For example, people prefer 
computers with personalities similar to their own (Moon & Nass, 1996; Nass, Moon, 
Fogg & Reeves, 1995) as well those with whom they are interdependent or share 
coalitional membership (Nass, Fogg & Moon, 1996).Together these findings indicate that 
people attend to interpersonally relevant features when considering novel objects that 
possess anthropomorphic cues.  
Relationships with objects 
People can also enter into ―parasocial‖ relationships (Horton & Whol, 1956) with 
anthropomorphized objects that may approximate human relationships suggesting that 
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when people think about anthropomorphized possessions, information relevant to 
relationships will also assume prominence. The formation of parasocial relationships 
between people and objects were once viewed as a transitory phase in children‘s 
development (Winnicott, 1953) but both children (Hood & Bloom, 2008) and adults 
report entering into relationships with objects (Thomson, MacInnis & Park, 2005; Ball & 
Tasaki, 1992; Fournier, 1998). As a consequence, people apply relational scripts when 
interacting with non-living entities. Children who have imaginary friends appear to 
describe these relationships in a manner that is similar to how they describe real 
friendships (Gleason, Sebanc & Hartup, 2002).  
Among adults, reciprocity norms are obeyed when interacting with objects. For 
example, people spent more time making aesthetic judgments to help a computer 
optimize its choice of colors to human taste when the computer first provided useful 
search information than when it first provided useless information (Fogg & Nass, 1997). 
Conversely, people are sensitive to when anthropomorphized objects do not live up to 
their end of the relationship. Agarwal (2004) found that consumers reacted negatively 
when they were led to believe that a bank ―brand‖ would adhere to communal norms but 
then violated them (i.e. by charging a fee for a bounced check in a communal 
relationship). 
Politeness norms are also obeyed when interacting with objects. Nass, Moon and 
Carney (2006) found that people adhere to politeness norms when interacting with 
machines, writing more favorable evaluations of a computer when typing directly on it 
than when writing the evaluation on an identical computer in another room. People are 
also more likely to adhere to social norms towards others in the presence of agentic cues. 
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Thus they divide resources more equally and are more likely to contribute to public goods 
when in the presence of symbolic eyes (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Bateson, Nettle & 
Roberts, 2006).   
Anthropomorphism and interpersonal emotions  
Once consumers enter into a relationship with an object, the emotional quality of 
their experience with the object may resemble the emotional quality of their experience 
with other people. Social interaction is pleasurable and imbuing a product with 
anthropomorphic cues leads consumers to experience more positive affect when 
interacting with it. Wang and colleagues had consumers use an online shopping website 
that either had a virtual interactive tour guide or consisted of a text only interface. They 
found that consumers interacting with the virtual tour guide reported more positive affect, 
more arousal, a greater sense of flow and greater purchase intentions and that all of these 
variables were mediated by perceptions of website sociability (Wang, Baker, Wagner & 
Wakefield, 2007).  
Indeed, even in the absence of anthropomorphic cues, some consumers 
spontaneously experience uniquely social emotions when interacting with objects, 
including love (Schultz, Kleine & Kerman, 1991) and trust (Aaker, Fournier & Brasel 
2004). Over time connections to special products and objects can grow, leading 
consumers to form a sense of attachment that may parallel interpersonal attachment 
patterns (Ball & Tasaki, 1992; Bowlby, 1969). Much like in interpersonal relationships, 
consumers can come to depend on objects, feeling a sense of security when they are close 
and distress when they are absent (Thomson et al., 2005). Some companies have 
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experimented with capitalizing on customers‘ feelings of loyalty to reduce business costs. 
For example, Zipcar decided to name all of its rental vehicles and reported that this led 
customers to be more diligent about cleaning and maintaining them (Levine, 2009). In 
combination, these observations suggest that consumers should be less willing to replace 
a product they own when they think about it in anthropomorphic terms. 
In a relational context, social features of identity are particularly salient and 
people are more likely than not to behave in a manner consistent with accessible features 
of identity (Oyserman, 2009). As a result, social relationships are maintained even when 
they require costly sacrifices (Simmons, Marine & Simmons, 1977) and people routinely 
invest resources in caring for the old, the sick and the weak, even when they can no 
longer serve a useful function (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Levine & 
Moreland, 2002).    
In combination, these considerations suggest that when consumers think about a 
product in anthropomorphic terms they should focus on attributes relevant to people 
rather than attributes relevant to objects. As a result, when considering products to 
purchase they should be (i) less likely to evaluate products according to their utilitarian 
attributes and (ii) more likely to consider attributes that are important in the interpersonal 
domain. When considering objects they already own, a similar logic should apply, but 
additionally, they should (iii) be reluctant to replace them following an anthropomorphic 
prime, reflecting people‘s willingness to maintain interpersonal relationships, (iv) 
especially if the strength of interpersonal relationships is a chronic concern. Finally, 
anthropomorphizing an object should lead to interpersonal emotions. Thus, when people 
experience a product failure they should (v) report experiencing more anger (an 
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interpersonal emotion) but not report experiencing more negative emotions that Such as 






Interest in Adult and Neonatal Anthropomorphized Products 
 
Consumers select products for a variety of reasons including communicating their 
identity to themselves and others, the pleasure experienced when purchasing or 
consuming a product and the product‘s utility. Consumer motives vary as a function of a 
product‘s uses and consumers tend to prefer products that can fulfill its expected 
functions. For example, consumers‘ preferences for food brands are driven by the 
hedonic quality of the consumption experience while preferences for cleaners are driven 
by their utilitarian qualities (Batra & Ahtola, 1991). Whether the product can fulfill its 
intended function usually trumps incidental features of the product such as brand image 
and brand personality (Zentes, Morschett & Schramm-Klein, 2008). In a study of retail 
store brands, Zentes and colleagues found that the effect of store performance on 
attitudinal and behavioral measures of customer loyalty far exceeded the effect of 
customers‘ perceptions of brand personality.  
Anthropomorphizing a product should reduce the usually observed link between 
product utility and consumers‘ desire to purchase it. In the social realm, instrumental
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 considerations are diluted by a number of additional features that must be integrated into 
a unified evaluation of the target. People serve many roles in each other‘s lives above and 
beyond utilitarian exchange and the fulfillment of these roles is not easily substitutable 
(Foa & Foa, 1974). Additionally, considerations of  the intentions behind actions (Falk, 
Fehr & Fischbacher, 2008), communality and relational status often trump considerations 
of instrumentality, like the actual contributions of the other‘s skills and competence to 
one‘s own outcomes (Wojciszke, Bazinska & Jaworski, 1998; for a recent review see 
Ybarra et al. 2008). Thus it would be expected that people‘s preference for an 
anthropomorphized product would be less dependent on whether or not it successfully 
serves any useful function.  
Further, anthropomorphizing a product should lead consumers to be attracted to 
products that have features that elicit an affilitive response toward other people.  People 
(and other mammals) are attracted to other agents that display ―cute‖ neonatal features 
such as large closely-spaced eyes positioned below the horizontal midline of the skull 
(Kindchenschema, Lorenz, 1946 as cited by Lobmaier, Sprengelmeyer, Wiffen & Perrett, 
2010). For example, people (especially women) pay more attention to infant faces than 
adult faces (Brosh, Sander & Scherer, 2007) and look at prototypically cute infant faces 
for longer (Hildebrandt & Fitzgerald, 1978). Cute faces also influence the evaluation of 
adults. For example, people with ―baby-faces‖ are perceived as more caring honest and 
warm (Berry & McArthur, 1985). Although some studies suggest that these biases may 
be specific to same-species infants (Brosh et al., 2007), anecdotally, animals will 
occasionally care for infants of other species, suggesting that like other processes 
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downstream of agent detection, care-giving responses are sometimes erroneously applied 
to incorrect targets.   
Thus it can be expected that when rating anthropomorphized objects, consumers 
should generally prefer products with ―cute‖ facial features over objects with adult facial 
features and may prefer anthropomorphized objects in general over non-
anthropomorphized objects. Further, regardless of how cute a product is, the presence of 
anthropomorphic cues should undermine the influence of instrumental considerations on 
product preferences. To test this, participants were presented with a picture and short 
description of a real but likely unfamiliar floor cleaning robot called ―Scooba‖ that was 
digitally manipulated to have adult or infant like anthropomorphic features or no 
anthropomorphic features at all. They rated how much they wanted to purchase a product 
like this before indicating how much time they spent cleaning their floors. The amount of 
time that the product would save them should be a less relevant consideration in the 
anthropomorphism conditions than in the non-anthropomorphism condition. Furthermore, 
to the extent that neonatal features elicit care-giving, consumers should want an ―infant‖ 
Scooba of their own. 
Method 
American participants (N = 113) were recruited online from Mechanical Turk and 
invited to complete a survey on ―product perceptions‖ in exchange for $ 0.25. 
Mechanical Turk is a crowd-sourcing that connects workers and employers. Previous 
research has shown that this population is generally representative of the US population 
as a whole, although it tends to be somewhat younger, poorer and more educated (for a 
discussion of Mechanical Turk population characteristics and recruitment norms see 
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Paolacci, Chandler & Ipierotis, 2010). They were randomly assigned to view one of three 
different pictures of a ―Scooba‖ floor cleaning robot: A Scooba with symbolic eyes 
(―adult‖ Scooba), a Scooba with symbolic eyes that were relatively larger and closer 
together (―infant‖ Scooba) and a third Scooba without symbolic eyes (control Scooba; 
Figure 1).  Subsequently, participants rated how much they wanted a Scooba of their own 
(1 = not at all interested, 7 = very interested). Finally, they indicated how much time they 
spent cleaning hard surface floors each week in a free response format and answered 
additional demographic questions.  
Results   
Interest in purchasing the Scooba was regressed on the amount of time 
participants spent cleaning hard surface floors, dummy coded condition variables 
representing the ―adult‖ and ―infant‖ Scoobas  and the interaction between time spent 
cleaning and condition. Overall, participants who spent more time cleaning their floors 
were more interested in purchasing a Scooba, β = -.45, t(110) = 3.26, p < .01.  
This was qualified by an interaction between time spent cleaning and condition.  
Specifically, the relationship between time spent cleaning and the desire to own a Scooba 
was attenuated for both the adult, β = .21, t(110) = 1.93, p < .06, and infant Scooba, β = -
.29, t(110) = 2.36, p < .05 (Figure 2). Expressed differently, there was a significant 
correlation between the time people spend cleaning hard surface floors and their desire to 
own a Scooba in the control condition, r(35) = .49, p < .001, but not in the adult Scooba, 
r(39) = .03, or infant Scooba, r(36) = -.04 conditions. This suggests that anthropomorphic 
primes shift attention away from the utilitarian value of the product.  
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Finally, although participants were not more interested in purchasing the adult 
Scooba than the control Scooba , t < 1, they were more interested in purchasing an infant 
Scooba than either the control or adult Scoobas,  β = .21, t(110) = 1.96, p = .05.  
Discussion 
This study suggests that imbuing a product with agentic features, such as 
symbolic eyes, undermines the relationship between the utility of the product and 
consumers‘ desire to own it. Further, although consumers are not unequivocally more 
interested in purchasing anthropomorphic products, they are more willing to consider 
purchasing a product with ―cute‖ anthropomorphic features. Since the influence between 
instrumental considerations and replacement intentions was attenuated for both the adult 
and infant Scooba, it is unlikely that people‘s preference for the infant Scooba is the 
result of more salient anthropomorphic cues. Rather, it is more likely that this difference 
reflects the positive connotations of cute facial features.  
Skeptics may wonder whether the results generated by this approach reflect the 
spontaneous application of social knowledge to objects as opposed to the influence of 
pragmatic linguistic or situational considerations. This is a concern that applies more 
generally to research on the consequences of anthropomorphic thought. From this 
perspective, the presentation of novel objects with human features may convey that the 
object is to be thought about in human terms – or why else would it be endowed with 
these features? Hence, the observation of apparent agentic beliefs about an 
anthropomorphized object may, at least in part, be the result of pragmatic inferences 
about the intentions of the communicator (Schwarz, 1996). I address these limitations in 
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the next study by manipulating the frame that people use when describing an object while 
holding the object constant.     
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Figure 1: Target stimuli used in experiment one 
 





Figure 2: Influence of time spent cleaning on product desirability 
 
 
The relationship between time spent cleaning hard surface floors and people‘s interest in 
purchasing a Scooba. The adult Scooba had small eyes, the infant Scooba had larger eyes 
below the horizontal midline while the control Scooba had no eyes (Figure 1) Frequency 






































Replacing Anthropomorphized Objects 
 
Neglect of the instrumental contributions of others is, if anything, more likely 
when deciding whether to maintain of old relationships than when deciding whether to 
form new relationships. People maintain interpersonal bonds with relatively little regard 
for the instrumental contributions offered by others (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; 
Jones & Vaughan, 1990) and retain feelings of loyalty even to groups to which they no 
longer belong (Moreland & McMinn, 1999). In addition to the features that people 
typically consider when interacting with a novel other (such as morality), qualities of the 
relationship itself further dilute attention to instrumental features of close others. These 
theoretical considerations, in conjunction with the data from the study reported in 
Chapter 3 suggest that when people anthropomorphize possessions, replacement 
intentions should be unrelated to the physical qualities of the object.  
Further, powerful social norms prevent the easy dissolution of interpersonal 
relationships (Ybarra et al., 2008). This suggests that although people may not be any 
more willing to purchase anthropomorphized products, they may be especially reluctant 
to replace anthropomorphized products that they currently own. In order to avoid some of 
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the methodological issues inherent in previous studies on anthropomorphism this 
prediction is tested by holding the objects people think about constant (computers that 
people already own) while manipulating whether it is thought of in psychological terms 
or not.  
Method 
Participants (N = 127) were recruited from the introductory psychology pool of a 
large mid-western university and completed the study online for credit. They were told: 
―We are conducting research on metaphors. You will be presented with a number of 
questions designed to examine how people interpret metaphors. Some of the metaphors 
may seem strange, but we would like you to try your best to answer them as best you can. 
After each metaphor, we will ask you a number of factual questions in order to 
understand your responses.‖  
In order to minimize demand characteristics, attention was shifted away from the 
dependant variables of interest by embedding the task in a series of other metaphors and 
by emphasizing that participants‘ descriptions of the metaphors themselves were the 
dependant variable of interest. All participants completed several free-response warm up 
questions followed by specific questions relating to the topic and vehicle of the metaphor 
(e.g. ―In what way is a basketball player a skyscraper?‖ followed by questions about 
basketball players and skyscrapers). Next, participants assigned to one of the three 
experimental conditions wrote about the way in which their computer was either a family 
member (Kin condition), a best friend (Friend condition), or a tool (Tool Condition; ―In 
what way is your computer your brother/best friend/a tool?‖); participants assigned to the 
Control condition made no metaphorical comparison for their computer. Subsequently, 
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participants were asked to describe their computer in their own words and reported how 
likely they were to replace it within the next 24 months (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so).  
Participants‘ open-ended descriptions of their computers were rated for valence 
by two coders blind to condition and the hypotheses of the experiment. Agreement 
between coders was high (intraclass correlation = .90, p < .001) and their scores were 
averaged to form an index of computer quality (-3 = extremely negative description; +3 = 
extremely positive description). 
Results 
Coders‘ ratings of participants‘ open-ended descriptions of their computers 
suggested that thinking of a computer in metaphorical terms resulted in a significant 
increase in the positivity of the descriptions, suggesting that all metaphors brought 
positive features of the computer to mind compared to the tool and control conditions,. 
Although people described anthropomorphized objects in more positive terms (kin, M = 
1.55, SE = .21; friend, M = 1.25, SE = .22) than non-anthropomorphized objects (tool, M 
= 1.13, SE = .21; control, M =.73, SE = .21),  Fcontrast(1, 121) = 3.27, p < .08, ηp
2
 = .03, an 
inspection of the means suggests that the most parsimonious explanation is that thinking 
about one‘s computer in metaphorical terms had a positive effect on descriptions, 
independent of whether the metaphor was anthropomorphic (kin, friend) or not (tool). 
Contrasts adjusting for the number of conducted and implicit contrasts (Contrasts: kin 1, 
friend 1, tool 1, control -3; kin 3, friend 1, tool -2, control -2; anthropomorphic v. non-
anthropomorphic, each of the anthropomorphic metaphors against the other conditions; 
see Rosenthal, Rosnow & Rubin, 2000) confirmed that this was in fact the case, F(1, 121) 
= 6.98, padjusted < .05, rcontrast(adjusted) = .18. 
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Turning to participant‘s willingness to replace their computers, participants 
wanted to replace their computer less when they had thought of it as a brother (M = 1.76, 
SE = .35) or as a friend (M = 1.73, SE = .37) than when they had thought of it as a tool (M 
= 2.50, SE = .37) or who did not think of their computer in metaphorical terms (control 
condition, M = 2.72, SE = .36). As expected, planned contrasts with the valence of the 
description included as a covariate revealed that anthropomorphizing a computer made 




, whereas the use 
of the non-anthropomorphic tool metaphor did not affect replacement intentions relative 
to the control condition, F < 1.   
Just as instrumental considerations did not influence people‘s desire for 
anthropomorphized products in the previous study, the perceived quality of the computer 
should not influence replacement intentions for anthropomorphized products. To test this 
hypothesis, participants‘ willingness to replace their computer was regressed on computer 
quality, a dummy coded variable comparing anthropomorphic versus non-
anthropomorphic conditions and the interaction between these variables. Reflecting the 
main effect discussed above, participants in the anthropomorphism conditions were less 
willing to replace it, β = -.43, t(120) = 3.47, p < .001. Additionally, as perceived 
computer quality increased, willingness to replace it decreased, β = -.42, t(120) = 3.69, p 
< .01. More important, these findings were qualified by the predicted interaction between 
anthropomorphism and computer quality, β = .42, t(120) = 2.78, p < .01. As shown in 
Figure 3, more negative descriptions of the computer‘s quality predicted participants‘ 
willingness to replace their computer in the non-anthropomorphic conditions, β = .35 




In sum, thinking about their computers in terms of any metaphor increased the 
positivity of participants‘ descriptions, independent of whether the metaphor was 
anthropomorphic (Kin and Friend conditions) or not (Tool Condition). Presumably, this 
is because all three metaphors draw attention to positive features of the computer, 
although the precise features that people think about may differ across conditions. More 
important, only anthropomorphic metaphors reduced participants‘ willingness to replace 
their computers and this effect held even after controlling for the positivity of their 
description of their computer. In contrast, participants who thought of their computer as a 
tool were just as likely to replace it as control group participants, despite having provided 
a more positive description. Finally, the positivity of participants‘ descriptions of their 
computers predicted their willingness to replace it in the tool condition and the control 
condition, but was unrelated to replacement intentions in the anthropomorphic metaphor 
conditions.  While these findings are consistent with our theoretical rationale, two 
possible alternative accounts deserve attention.  
First, although the anthropomorphism manipulations were embedded in a set of 
questions about other metaphors, it is possible that demand characteristics contributed to 
their findings. Specifically, it may be difficult for people to say they will replace an 
object that they had just described as a friend or a family member, regardless of whether 
they accept the anthropomorphic premise. Second, thinking about one‘s computer as a 
friend or family member may prime positive attributes that may otherwise not come to 
mind and these attributes, rather than anthropomorphic thought per se, may have reduced 
reported replacement intentions. Inspection of participants‘ free-response descriptions of 
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their computers provides no apparent support for this possibility; moreover, the above 
results were obtained while controlling for positivity of the description. Nevertheless, a 
replication that avoids this ambiguity would be welcome. I address these concerns in the 
next study by replicating the findings reported above using a more subtle manipulation of 




Figure 3: Influence of product quality on replacement intentions in Chapter 5 
 
Willingness to purchase a replacement computer it in the next 12 months as a function of 
experimental condition and the quality of the computer. Participants in the 
anthropomorphism condition described either how their computer was their best friend or 
their brother. Control conditions either described the way their computer was a useful 
tool or wrote nothing. Computer quality was evaluated by coding participants‘ 
descriptions of their computers. Low and high values are plotted one standard deviation 































Subtle Agentic Cues and Replacement Intentions 
 
To address the potential demand characteristics inherent to the experiment 
reported in Chapter Five, this study uses a less direct manipulation of anthropomorphic 
thought. Instead, we ask participants to simply evaluate a product using scales anchored 
in psychological or physical terms. Following this manipulation, participants describe the 
product in their own words and report how likely they are to replace it in the near future.  
Method 
Participants who owned cars (N = 92) were prescreened from an undergraduate 
subject pool and completed the study online for partial course credit. They were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions (anthropomorphism, object, and control) 
and told that the survey explored ―what people think about their cars.‖ Participants 
assigned to the anthropomorphism condition first rated their car on five bipolar scales 
anchored with personality traits (reserved - enthusiastic, quarrelsome - sympathetic, 
dependable - irresponsible, open to new experiences – uncreative, and anxious - calm), 
whereas participants assigned to the object condition rated physical attributes of their car  
(quiet – loud, unresponsive – responsive, unreliable – reliable, versatile – limited, shaky - 
 
 34 
smooth) while participants assigned to the control condition completed neither of these 
scales. Subsequently, participants described their car in their own words and rated the 
likelihood that they would replace their car before they left college (1 = not at all, 7 = 
very much so).   
Results  
Pilot testing and manipulation check.  
Pilot testing using a different sample revealed that in a free association task, 
people spontaneously listed more agentic nouns (people or other living entities) following 
presentation of the anthropomorphism adjectives than the object adjectives, F(1, 18) = 
45.33, p < .001, confirming that the personality adjectives are more likely to bring 
anthropomorphic concepts to mind.  
Within this sample, participants‘ descriptions of their cars were coded for the 
presence of anthropomorphic language by two independent coders. Anthropomorphic 
language included mentioning that their vehicle had a name, use of animate pronouns 
(he/she), elaboration of the vehicle‘s ―personality‖ using agentic trait descriptions beyond 
those provided in the rating scales, and the use of interpersonal emotions (e.g. ―love‖; 
Schultz et al., 1991) when describing their attitude toward their car. Agreement between 
coders about the presence of anthropomorphic language was excellent, κ = .88 (Fleiss, 
1981). A chi-square analysis revealed that participants were more likely describe their car 
in anthropomorphic language in the Anthropomorphism condition(48%) than in the 
object (29%) or control condition (15%), χ
2
(2,90) = 8.41, p < .02. This confirms that our 
manipulation worked as intended.  
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Participants‘ open ended descriptions of their cars were also coded for valence by 
two coders blind to conditions and hypotheses (intraclass correlation = .80, p < .001); the 
coders‘ ratings were averaged to create a composite measure of perceived car quality (-3 
= extremely negative description; +3 = extremely positive description). Planned contrasts 
were computed to compare the anthropomorphism condition to the other two conditions 
and both ratings scale conditions to the no-rating control condition; neither of these 
contrasts showed a difference in overall valence of participants‘ descriptions of their car, 
Fs < 1.  
Hypotheses tests.  
Next I turn to participants‘ willingness to replace their car. A planned contrast 
(Rosenthal et al., 2000) comparing the Anthropomorphism condition to the other two 
conditions confirmed that participants reported less intention to replace their car if they 
rated its personality characteristics (anthropomorphism condition, M = 2.23, SD = 1.54) 
than if they rated its technical characteristics (object condition, M = 3.14, SD = 2.24) or 
provided no ratings (control condition, M = 3.15, SD = 2.04), F(1,89) = 4.52, p < .04, ηp
2
 
= .05. Follow up contrasts revealed that the anthropomorphic condition differed from the 
object condition, F(1, 89) = 3.21, p < .05, one-tailed, as well as the control condition, 
F(1, 89) = 3.55, p < .05, one-tailed, whereas the latter two conditions did not, F < 1.2. 
To test whether this pattern implies the predicted dissociation between perceived 
product quality and replacement intentions, we analyzed the relationship between the 
valence of participants‘ open ended car descriptions and their replacement intentions in 
the anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic conditions using regression. Replacement 
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intentions were regressed on a contrast code comparing the anthropomorphic condition to 
the object and control conditions (for a discussion of planned contrasts in regression 
analyses see Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). Overall, participants reported higher 
intentions to replace their car the more negatively they had described it, β = -.50 t(87) = 
4.17, p < .001, as one would expect. In addition, they reported lower intentions to replace 
their car when they had thought about it in personality terms, β = -.21, t(87) = 2.21, p < 
.03, reflecting the findings discussed above. More important, however, these main effects 
were qualified by an interaction between anthropomorphic prime and car quality, β = .25, 
t(87) = 2.10, p < .05, shown in Figure 4. An examination of the simple effects revealed 
that whereas poor quality reports were associated with increased intention to replace in 
the object and control conditions, β = -.45, t(58) = 3.56, p < .001,  intention to replace 
was unrelated to quality in the anthropomorphic condition β = -.12, t(28) < 1.  
This pattern is also reflected in the correlations between quality descriptions and 
replacement intentions. The more positively participants described their car, the less 
willing they were to replace it in the object condition, r(22) = -.50, p < .02, followed by 
the control condition, r(26)=-.32, p < .10. In contrast, the relationship between these 
variables was small and not significant in the anthropomorphism condition, r(24)=-.15, p 
>.4, as observed in the regression.  
Discussion 
In sum, participants described their cars using more anthropomorphic and 
interpersonal language when a preceding question asked them to rate their car on 
personality traits rather than technical characteristics, confirming the successful induction 
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of anthropomorphic thoughts.  While the anthropomorphism manipulation did not affect 
the valence of participants‘ open ended descriptions of their cars, it did affect their 
replacement intentions. As predicted, participants (i) reported lower replacement 
intentions when they were induced to think about their car in anthropomorphic terms. 
Moreover, (ii) perceived product quality, as coded based on the valence of participants‘ 
open ended descriptions, predicted replacement intentions in the absence of 
anthropomorphic primes, but was unrelated to replacement intention when 
anthropomorphic beliefs were primed. These findings provide first evidence that 
anthropomorphism can decouple product quality and replacement intentions, consistent 
with the conjecture that consumers may hesitate to replace anthropomorphized 
possessions just because they get unreliable, much as they hesitate to replace close 
friends just because they get old and cranky. 
Nevertheless, two methodological concerns deserve attention; both pertain to 
unintended effects of our anthropomorphic thought manipulation. First, the personality 
traits we used as anthropomorphic primes may also have primed other positive features 
of the product. These features may be unrelated to anthropomorphic thought per se, but 
may result in more positive evaluations and hence lower replacement intentions. Second, 
rating the car on physical characteristics vs. personality characteristics may not only have 
primed physical vs. anthropomorphic concepts (as was intended), but also the rated 
attributes themselves may have differential evaluative implications. Both of these 
concerns imply that differences in anthropomorphic thought may be confounded with a 
differential accessibility of valenced attributes of the car. Empirically, the data provide no 
support for this conjecture. Any difference in the accessibility of valenced attributes 
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should be reflected in participants‘ subsequent free-response descriptions of their cars; 




Figure 4: Influence of product quality on replacement intentions in Chapter 6 
 
 
The relationship between description valence and people‘s willingness to replace their car 
before they leave college. Participants in the anthropomorphism condition filled out a 
personality questionnaire for their car. control conditions either rated their car on non-
anthropomorphic traits or did not rate their car. Description valence was evaluated by 
coding participants‘ descriptions of their cars. Low and high values are plotted one 

































Connotations of Warmth and Replacement Intentions 
 
The studies presented in Chapters Five and Six demonstrate that in the absence of 
anthropomorphic thought, consumers base their replacement intentions on the perceived 
quality of the product, but do not attend to product quality once the product is 
anthropomorphized. This observation is consistent with the assumption that instrumental 
considerations loom larger in the impersonal than in the personal world. By the same 
token, however, features that are valued in the interpersonal domain should be more 
likely to affect product replacement intentions when consumers are induced to think 
about the product in anthropomorphic terms than when they are not. Support for this 
hypothesis was found in Chapter Four, where people demonstrated a preference for 
anthropomorphized objects with neonatal features. However this study was limited in that 
the anthropomorphic prime was not independent of the socially relevant feature, thus it 
does not clearly demonstrate that some features assume relevance for anthropomorphized 
objects that would otherwise be ignored for non-anthropomorphized objects.  
In order to test this hypothesis more directly, this study manipulates participants‘ 
perception of whether their car‘s color is ―warm‖ or ―cold.‖ While objects are evaluated 
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according to their utility, people are evaluated according to both their potential 
instrumental contributions (―intellect‖; Rosenburg, Nelson & Vivekananthan, 1968; or 
―competence,‖ Wojciszke et al., 1998) and the intent that underlies their actions (referred 
to as ―sociability‖ or ―morality‖). In the interpersonal domain, ―warmth‖ is frequently 
used to metaphorically represent sociability. Consequently, people described as warm are 
perceived to be more generous (Asch, 1946) and even incidental cues of warmth such as 
the sensation of warmth emitted from a hot coffee cup can lead to global evaluations of 
positivity in interpersonal contexts (Williams & Bargh, 2008; Ijzerman & Semin, 2009).  
While temperature connotations are of little relevance when evaluating products 
that are not intended to be a specific temperature, they should assume special importance 
when thinking about other agents. Thus, if anthropomorphic primes lead people to attend 
to socially relevant information, than products with metaphorically warm connotations 
should be preferred over products with metaphorically cold connotations. We test this 
prediction by manipulating the accessibility of anthropomorphic concepts and examining 
whether anthropomorphic thoughts lead people to feel especially loyal toward products 
with metaphorically warm connotations.   
Method 
Participants (N = 127) completed the study online for partial course credit; they 
were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (color label: warm vs. cold) x 3 (prime: 
anthropomorphism, object and a no prime control) factorial between-participants design.  
To manipulate the warm or cold connotations of the car, participants were asked 
to select the color that most closely resembled their own car‘s color from a matrix of nine 
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colored squares. The five most common car colors (accounting for 90% of all new car 
sales; Dupont, 2006) were labeled with ―warm‖ (e.g., ―summer blue‖) or ―cold‖ (e.g., 
―blizzard blue‖) names. All participants saw a mixture of ―warm‖ and ―cold‖ color names 
along with four foil colors (e.g., ―canary yellow‖) and had to remember the name of their 
own car‘s color as part of an alleged memory task. Note that this procedure ensured that 
all participants were exposed to a mix of warm and cold color names, thus avoiding the 
problem that some participants would only be exposed to warm and others only to cold 
concepts; instead, the conditions merely differ in whether the color of the participant‘s 
own car is associated with a warm or cold label. This procedure randomly assigned 58 
participants to the warm and 64 participants to the cold condition; 5 participants who 
forgot the color name associated with their car were dropped from analysis.
2
 
Next, participants were randomly assigned to either complete a questionnaire 
measuring their cars physical or psychological traits using the thought manipulations 
used in Chapter Six. Subsequently, they described their car in their own words, indicated 
their desire to replace their car before they left college (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), and 
reported the name assigned to the color of their car (thus completing the memory task).  
Results 
Manipulation check.  
Participants‘ descriptions of their cars were again coded for the presence of 
anthropomorphic language by two independent coders. Agreement between coders about 
the presence of anthropomorphic language was excellent, κ = .86 (Fliess, 1981). A chi-
square analysis revealed that participants in the anthropomorphism condition were more 
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likely describe their car in anthropomorphic language (24%) than participants in either 
the object (7%) or the control condition (6%), χ
2
(2,162) = 10.82, p < .01. The object and 
control conditions did not differ. This confirms that the manipulation worked as intended.  
Participants‘ open ended descriptions of their cars were coded for valence by two 
coders blind to conditions and hypotheses (intraclass correlation = .89, p < .001); the 
coders‘ ratings were averaged to create a composite measure of perceived product quality 
(-3 = extremely negative description; +3 = extremely positive description). Analyses of 
this index of perceived product quality revealed no influence of the experimental 
manipulations (all ps > .3). 
Hypotheses tests.  
Replicating Study 1, a planned contrast (Rosenthal et al., 2000) comparing the 
anthropomorphism condition to the other two conditions confirmed that participants 
reported less intention to replace their car after rating its personality characteristics 
(anthropomorphism condition, M = 2.83, SD = 1.54) than after rating its technical 
characteristics (object condition, M = 3.84, SD = 2.24) or providing no attribute rating 
(control condition,  M = 3.82, SD = 2.04), F(1, 118) = 6.15, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .05. Follow-up 
contrasts revealed that the anthropomorphism condition differed from the object 
condition , F(1, 118) = 5.08, p < .05, as well as the control condition, F(1, 118) = 4.15, p 
< .05, whereas the latter two conditions did not, F < 1.  
Next we turn to the influence of description valence and temperature prime. 
Replacement intentions were regressed on description valence, the warm/cold 
manipulation and a contrast code comparing the anthropomorphism condition with the 
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object and control conditions. Overall, participants who described their car negatively 
were more willing to replace it, β = -.47, t(115) = 4.84, p < .001. Moreover, participants 
assigned to the anthropomorphism condition reported lower replacement intentions than 
participant assigned to the object or control conditions, as reflected in a main effect of the 
dummy variable representing the anthropomorphism condition, β = -.22, t(115) = 2.65, p 
< .01. However, these main effects were qualified by two interactions.  Replicating Study 
1, an interaction between the  anthropomorphism condition and perceived product quality 
again indicates that anthropomorphic thought dissociates replacement intentions from 
perceived product quality, as shown in Figure 5, β = .22, t(115) = 2.34, p < .03. As in 
Study 1, participants in the control, r(34) = -.59, p < .001, and object condition, r(45) = 
.41, p < .001, reported higher replacement intentions the more negatively they described 
their cars, whereas the two variables were unrelated in the anthropomorphism condition, 
r(40) = -.07, ns.  
Going beyond the replication of Study 1, an interaction of the two experimental 
manipulations was also observed, β = -.21, t(115) = 2.12, p < .04 (Figure 6). An 
examination of simple slopes revealed that, as predicted, participants were particularly 
unwilling to replace anthropomorphized cars when their color had been associated with a 
warm (M = 2.23, SD = 1.77) rather than cold (M = 3.48, SD = 2.10) color label, t(115) = 
1.90, , p < .05, one-tailed, for the simple effect. In contrast, color labels did not influence 
participants‘ replacement willingness in the object (Mwarm = 4.00, SD = 2.44 and Mcold = 
3.72, SD = 1.86) and control conditions (Mwarm = 4.17, SD = 2.14 and Mcold = 3.44, SD = 





Replicating the studies reported in Chapters Five and Six, participants (i) reported 
a lower willingness to replace their car when they had thought about it in 
anthropomorphic terms and (ii) their replacement intention was decoupled from their 
perception of the car‘s quality, as measured by the valence of participant‘s descriptions of 
their cars. Extending these findings, participants who had thought about their car in 
anthropomorphic terms were (iii) particularly unwilling to replace it when they were led 
to perceive its color as ―warm‖, a highly valued trait in the interpersonal domain. In 
contrast, warm/cold connotations of the car‘s color did not affect the replacement 
intentions reported by participants in the non-anthropomorphic thought conditions. This 
provides further support for the claim that people attend to socially relevant features of 
anthropomorphized objects by disentangling the accessibility of anthropomorphic 




Figure 5: Influence of product quality on replacement intentions in Chapter 7 
 
 
The relationship between description valence and people‘s willingness to replace their 
vehicle before they leave college. Participants in the anthropomorphism condition filled 
out a personality questionnaire for their car. Control conditions either rated their car on 
non-anthropomorphic traits or did not rate their car. Description valence was evaluated 
by coding participants‘ descriptions of their cars. Low and high values are plotted one 





























Anthropomorphic Prime Control Conditions
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Figure 6: Influence of temperature connotations on replacement intentions.  
 
The relationship between temperature prime and people‘s willingness to replace their car 
before they leave college.  Participants in the anthropomorphism condition filled out a 
personality questionnaire for their car. Control conditions either rated their car on non-
anthropomorphic traits or did not rate their car. Cold and warm prime refers to the 

































Attachment and Replacement Intentions 
If thinking about the psychological features of an object leads people to 
anthropomorphize it, then individual differences relevant to interpersonal relationships 
should influence how people think and feel about them. In particular, consumers‘ 
treatment of anthropomorphized products may be influenced by their attachment style. 
Attachment style can be thought of as the collection of social scripts that outline 
appropriate behaviors toward and likely responses from specific relationship partners as 
well as abstract representations of social interactions in general (for a review see 
Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000). Attachment style influences interpretations of both the 
ambiguous behavior of familiar others (Baldwin et al., 1993) and early impressions of 
strangers (Eastwick & Finkel, 2008) and the perceivers resulting emotional response. 
Although people can have multiple attachment styles that reflect their unique history with 
different individuals (Baldwin et al., 1996), people typically have a general attachment 
style that is formed early in childhood (Bowlby, 1969) and remains stable over time and 
across adult relationships (Tidwell, Reis & Shaver, 1996).  
Overview of attachment styles 
Initial research on infant-parent attachment identified three primary attachment 
―styles‖ - secure, anxious and avoidant (Bowlby, 1982). Infant attachment style is 
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classified primarily by the concern the infant displays when their caregiver is absent and 
their response to caregivers upon their return. Research on adult attachment was inspired 
by this research but uses a somewhat different taxonomy that emerged through the use of 
self-report measures rather than behavioral observation. Adult attachment researchers 
situate attachment styles on a two-dimensional plane. One dimension is the degree of 
negativity one feels about themselves (―anxiety,‖ or more accurately the perceived 
likelihood of rejection by others) and is correlated with self-esteem. The other dimension 
expressing the degree of negativity one feels about others (―avoidance‖) and corresponds 
roughly to sociability; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991).  
The four quadrants of these intersecting planes represent attachment tendencies 
that map roughly onto the three attachment styles first identified by infant attachment 
researchers. Most people enjoy the company others but have little fear of rejection or 
abandonment and are considered securely attached (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). 
Adults who desire social contact but fear rejection are considered ―preoccupied‖ and 
correspond roughly to ―anxious‖ attachment in infant research. The self-report 
methodology makes it possible for researchers to divide the infant category of ―avoidant‖ 
into two subtypes depending on individuals‘ motives for avoiding others. Adults who feel 
positively about themselves but remain aloof from others are ―dismissive.‖ In contrast, 
adults who are so concerned about rejection by others that social contact is aversive are 
considered ―fearful.‖ The dimensions of anxiety and avoidance are orthogonal and the 
influence of both can be examined simultaneously. This particular experiment focuses on 
the influence of anxious attachment and thus I turn to the influence of anxious attachment 
patterns on relationships in more detail.     
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Influence of anxious attachment styles on interpersonal relationships 
 People who are preoccupied or fearful are chronically concerned that others will 
reject them. Consequently, these individuals report feeling more negative affect following 
the dissolution of a relationship (Fraley, Davis & Shaver, 1997) or even when separated 
from their partners for a few days (Diamond, Hicks & Otter-Henderson, 2008). As a 
physiological marker of this response, anxious individuals also show more HPA axis 
activation (cortisol response) when separated from close others than non-anxious 
individuals (Powers, Pietromonaco, Gunlicks & Sayer, 2006). 
In order to alleviate these feelings of distress, people who have anxious 
attachment orientations try to engage in behaviors that affirm the strength of the 
relationship. For example, in a naturalistic study Fraley and Shaver (1998) found that 
anxious/fearful individuals saying goodbye to loved ones at an airport were more likely 
to touch , hold on to follow their close other.  Likewise, when close others are absent, 
anxious/fearful individuals are more likely to try and initiate telephone contact (Diamond 
et al., 2008). The desire to preserve relationships can persist even when the relationship if 
of poor quality. As a result, anxiously attached individuals are more likely to resume 
dissolved romantic relationships (Kirkpatrick & Hazan, 1994) and remain in abusive 
relationships (Henderson, Bartholomew, Trinke & Kwong, 2005). From this it may 
follow that just as people with anxious attachment styles are unwilling to replace other 
people, so to may they be unwilling to replace anthropomorphized objects.   
Attachment to Objects 
As discussed earlier, consumer psychologists note that consumers can become 
―attached‖ to products and brands (Ball & Tasaki, 1994; Schultz et al., 1991; Thompson 
 
 51 
et al., 2005). In consumer research this refers to a unidimensional feeling of personal 
emotional connectedness. Since this represents positive feelings about a target it 
corresponds roughly to the avoidance dimension of interpersonal attachment. Concerns 
about rejection (―anxiety‖) are typically irrelevant when interacting with inanimate 
objects. Thus although object ―attachment‖ in consumer research clearly draws on the 
metaphor of interpersonal attachment, it is a simpler construct that does not require much 
beyond an evaluation of the object on the part of perceivers.  
There is some evidence that suggests that people treat objects in a way that more 
closely resemble a relationship, for example by using interpersonal emotions such as 
―love‖ to describe them (Schultz et al., 1991). This is particularly apparent among 
children, who sometimes acquire ―transitional‖ objects (Winnicott 1953) that become a 
surrogate for a caregiver. Supporting this claim, research has shown that children with 
transitional objects are more likely to touch or hold the object - such as a blanket or a 
stuffed animal - when in mildly stressful situations (Triebenbacher & Tegano, 1993), 
mirroring the comfort seeking behavior typical to an attachment relationship. Likewise, 
during stressful situations such as a visit to a doctor‘s office, the presence of transitional 
objects is as comforting as the presence of a caregiver (Ybarra, Passman & Eisenberg, 
2000). These findings suggest that at a minimum, objects can assume part of the 
functional role of attachment figures among children.  
While objects can act as surrogate attachment figures, researchers examining 
whether people‘s attachment style influences whether they develop relationships with 
objects have generally found more mixed evidence. Securely attached children are more 
likely to acquire a transitional object (Steir & Brauch, 2000; Lehman, Denham, Moser & 
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Reeves, 1992; but see also Passman, 1987). However, one study found that although high 
levels of anxiety did not make children particularly likely to acquire transitional objects, 
anxious children may retain transitional objects for longer than developmentally 
appropriate (Bachar et al., 1998). Likewise, among adults, researchers have shown that 
people with anxious attachment styles more readily form parasocial bonds with television 
characters (Cole & Leets, 1999) and religious entities (Kirkpatrick & Shaver, 1990).  
There are two possible explanations of these findings. Drawing from research on 
adults, some researchers predict that attachment style may influence the likelihood of 
perceiving agency in inanimate objects (Epley et al., 2007). This account assumes that 
anxiously attached individuals are chronically motivated to seek out relationships with 
others. As a result, they are predicted to be sensitive to the presence of agentic cues and 
thus may readily anthropomorphize objects. This claim is further supported by studies 
that demonstrate that loneliness (which is assumed to correlate with an anxious 
attachment) increases the perception of agency in nonliving objects (Epley, Akalis, 
Waytz & Cacioppo, 2008; but see also Rubin, Perse & Powell, 1985). This account does 
not, however, provide a compelling explanation for why securely attached children 
acquire transitional objects earlier than others, forcing one to assume that a third variable 
that is negatively correlated with attachment anxiety contributes to the early acquisition 
of transitional objects.   
An alternative interpretation is that people‘s attachment styles do not influence 
whether they anthropomorphize an object, but instead influence how they treat 
anthropomorphized objects. This perspective could reconcile the apparent conflict 
between research demonstrating that securely attached young children are more likely to 
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possess transitional objects while anxiously attached adolescents and adults are more 
likely to engage in relationships with objects. People with secure attachments have less 
difficulty establishing relationships with others, and so too do they acquire transitional 
objects more readily (Steir & Brauch, 2000; Lehman, et al., 1992). In contrast, 
individuals with anxious attachment patterns hold onto and invest in relationships, even if 
they are of poor quality, and so too do they hold on to transitional objects for longer than 
appropriate (Bachar et al., 1998) and invest themselves in targets that cannot reciprocate 
(Cole & Leets, 1999). Thus attachment patterns may influence how people establish and 
maintain relationships with objects rather than their overall desire for them.  
Based on these accounts, the purpose of this experiment is to test the general 
prediction that people with anxious attachment styles (―preoccupied‖ and ―fearful‖) are 
reluctant to replace anthropomorphized objects. Both of these accounts agree that anxious 
attachment should predict greater reluctance to replace anthropomorphized objects, albeit 
for two different reasons. On one hand, as predicted by models of agent detection (Epley 
et al., 2007), an anxious attachment style may make people more sensitive to the presence 
of anthropomorphic primes and all people who anthropomorphize objects are equally 
reluctant to replace them. On the other hand, as predicted by research on interpersonal 
relationships, an anxious attachment style should not influence the perception of agency 
but may influence how people treat objects once they are classified as agents.  
To address these two mechanisms, I also examine the relationship between 
attachment style and the use of anthropomorphic concepts in participants‘ descriptions of 
their possessions. If anxious attachment increases the likelihood of perceiving agency 
than people with anxious attachment styles should use more anthropomorphic language. 
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If, on the other hand, anxious attachment changes how people relate to 
anthropomorphized object, then attachment style should influence replacement intentions 
without influencing the use of anthropomorphic language.   
Method 
Participants (N = 150) completed the study online for partial course credit; they 
were randomly assigned to either think of the psychological features of their computer 
(anthropomorphism condition) or the physical features of their computer (object 
condition). Next, participants described their computer in their own words and indicated 
their desire to replace it before they left college (1 = not at all; 7 = very much).  
Participant attachment style was measured as a part of an earlier prescreening 
questionnaire. Participants rated the extent to which descriptions of each of the four adult 
attachment styles were descriptive of their own feelings about relationships (adopted 
from Bartholomew and Horowitz, 1991). A score representing the degree of anxiety were 
calculated by taking the difference between endorsement of high anxiety attachment 
styles (―preoccupied‖ and ―fearful‖) and low anxiety attachment styles (―secure‖ and 
―avoidant‖). A score representing the degree of avoidance was calculated by taking the 
difference between endorsement of high avoidance items (―fearful‖ and ―avoidant‖ ) and 
low avoidance items (―secure‖ and ―preoccupied‖), allowing individual differences in 
both dimensions of attachment orientation be examined. These scores were not 







Manipulation checks.  
Participants‘ descriptions of their computers were again coded for the presence of 
anthropomorphic language by two coders. Agreement between coders about the presence 
of anthropomorphic language was good, κ = .74 (Fliess, 1981). A chi-square analysis 
revealed that participants in the anthropomorphism condition were more likely describe 
their computer in anthropomorphic language (32%) than participants in the object 
condition (5%) Fisher‘s exact, p < .001. This confirms that the manipulation worked as 
intended.  
Participants‘ open-ended descriptions of their cars were coded for valence by two 
coders blind to conditions and hypotheses (α = .90); the coders‘ ratings were averaged to 
create a composite measure of perceived product quality (-3 = extremely negative 
description; +3 = extremely positive description). Analyses of this index of perceived 
product quality revealed that contrary to earlier studies, people in the anthropomorphism 
condition described their computers more positively (M = 1.09, SD = 1.37) than in the 
object condition (M = .51, SD = 1.11), F(1, 137) = 7.78, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .05.  
Hypothesis Tests.  
As discussed earlier, attachment style may influence how sensitive people are to 
the presence of other agents. To test whether this is the case, condition (dummy coded), 
anxiety, avoidance and the interaction between each attachment dimension and condition 
were regressed on the presence of anthropomorphic language, revealing the expected 
main effect of condition, β = 10.83, Wald = 12.22, p < .001, However, this finding was 
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qualified by an interaction between condition and anxiety, such that more anxious 
individuals were marginally more likely to use anthropomorphic language in the 
anthropomorphism condition, β = 1.31, Wald = 3.37, p < .07.  
In order to explore this finding further, anthropomorphic language was recoded 
into the spontaneous use of anthropomorphic descriptions of objects (e.g. personality 
traits and personal pronouns) and  the expression interpersonal emotions (i.e. love) to 
describe feelings toward the object. Each of these subcategories was examined using the 
analytic strategy described above. Anthropomorphic cognitions were more likely in the 
anthropomorphism condition, β = 10.73, Wald = 7.22, p < .01 but were uninfluenced by 
attachment style, Wald < 1, ns,  indicating that anxiously attached individuals were no 
more likely to attribute anthropomorphic traits to their computers.  
Turning to the expression of interpersonal emotion, the same analysis revealed a 
marginal main effect of the anthropomorphism condition, β = 17.42, Wald = 3.65, p <.06. 
However, in contrast to the use of anthropomorphic descriptions, for interpersonal 
emotion there was also a marginal main effect of anxiety, β = 0.70, Wald = 3.60, p = .06, 
qualified by an interaction between anxiety and condition, β = 1.70, Wald = 6.07, p < .02 
indicating that people who are high in anxiety are especially likely to spontaneously use 
interpersonal emotion words when describing anthropomorphized computers (Figure 7).  
By considering the use of anthropomorphic descriptions and emotional responses 
separately, it seems less likely that people with anxious attachment styles are more 
sensitive to anthropomorphic cues. They are no more likely to use anthropomorphic 
descriptions when referring to their computers. However, they seem to be more likely to 
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report experiencing feeling love for their anthropomorphized objects. One possible 
explanation for their frequent use of the word ―love‖ is that anxiously attached 
individuals simply feel more positively towards anthropomorphized objects. To rule out 
this possibility, condition, anxiety, avoidance and the interactions between each 
attachment dimension and condition were regressed on coder‘s evaluations of subjects‘ 
descriptions of computer quality. Other than the main effect of condition reported earlier, 
there were no other main effects or interactions. Of particular note, people with more 
anxious attachment styles were no more positive in their description of their computers in 
the anthropomorphic condition than people with less anxious attachment styles, t < 1 for 
the interaction. Thus, although anxiously attached people are more likely to say that they 
feel love towards their computer following an anthropomorphic prime, the overall 
positivity of their descriptions did not mirror this pattern.  
Finally, replacement intentions were examined using a similar analytic strategy. 
Condition, anxiety, avoidance and the interaction between each attachment style and 
condition were regressed on replacement intentions. Computer quality was also included 
as a covariate to eliminate its confounding influence on replacement intentions. 
Participants assigned to the anthropomorphism condition reported marginally lower 
replacement intentions than participants assigned to the Object condition, as reflected in a 
main effect of the dummy variable representing the anthropomorphism condition, β = -
.16, t(134) = 1.78, p < .08. There was also a marginal main effect of anxiety, β = 221, 
t(134) = 1.88, p = .06. However, these effects were qualified by an interaction between 
anxiety and condition, β = -.334, t(134) = 2.80, p = .01.  
 
 58 
An examination of simple slopes that explored this interaction revealed that 
condition had no effect on participants who scored one standard deviation below average 
in anxiety, t(134) < 1. In contrast, participants who scored one standard higher than 
normal on anxiety were less willing to replace their computer in the anthropomorphism 
condition (M =  3.26, SD = .50) than in the object condition (M = 4.68, SD = .59), t(134) 
= 2.83, p < .01. Put differently, in the object condition, anxiety was modestly associated 
with an increased willingness to replace their computers, r(77) = .21, p < .06, while in the 
anthropomorphism condition, anxiety was associated with a decreased willingness to 
replace their computers, r(70) = -.29, p < .05 (Figure 8). Taken together, this suggests 
people with anxious attachment styles are particularly unwilling to replace 
anthropomorphized objects.   
 Discussion 
Replicating the studies reported in Chapters Five through Seven, participants 
reported a somewhat lower willingness to replace their computers when they had thought 
about them in anthropomorphic terms, even after controlling for differences in the 
positivity they felt towards anthropomorphized and non-anthropomorphized objects. 
Extending these findings, participants who had anxious attachment patterns were 
particularly unwilling to replace objects when they thought of them in anthropomorphic 
terms suggesting that interpersonal attachment style influences how consumers treat 
anthropomorphized products.  
Additionally, anxious attachment patterns did not predict the use of 
anthropomorphic descriptions of objects. This seems to suggest that people with anxious 
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attachment styles are not necessarily more likely to perceive agency in their environment 
as predicted by other researchers (Epley et al, 2007).  However, people with anxious 
attachment styles were more likely to spontaneously mention interpersonal emotions (i.e. 
love) when describing their objects. Interestingly, anxiously attached people‘s 
descriptions of their computers were not more positive overall. Low anxiety individuals 
provided positive descriptions of their computers without expressing love, while some 
anxious individuals freely admitted the flaws of an object, before professing that they 
―love it anyway.‖  
This finding does not lead unambiguous support for either explanation of why 
anxiously attached individuals are reluctant to replace their possessions. One 
interpretation is that although drawing attention to the ―psychological‖ features of an 
object does not lead people with anxious attachment styles to perceive their possessions 
in anthropomorphic terms it does lead them to reconsture ―ownership‖ of objects as a 
―relationship.‖ However, it is also possible that the anxious individuals are more sensitive 
to anthropomorphic primes but are also more likely to attend to their relationship with 
others. As a result, in the limited space provided they may choose to emphasize these 
feelings at the expense of elaborating on its psychological features. . A third possibility is 
that the anthropomorphic prime is equally likely to make anxious and non-anxious 
individuals think about objects in relational terms, but that this evokes a particularly 
strong emotional response from anxious individuals leading them to express feelings of 
love.  
This ambiguity highlights the limitations of using indirect methods to assess the 
accessibility of relational thoughts and feelings. In the relatively short descriptions 
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participants provided, the expression of interpersonal feelings was nearly perfectly 
correlated with the use of interpersonal thoughts. Future studies could fruitfully address 
this issue by examining whether people with anxious attachment styles are more likely to 
adhere to relational norms that do not require feelings of love. For example, the former 
explanation would predict that anxious individuals would obey communal or exchange 
norms when interacting with an object depending on which rule were contextually 
appropriate. The latter explanation would predict that people would predict that anxiously 




Figure 7: Relationship between attachment anxiety and use of interpersonal emotion 
words 
 
The relationship between attachment style and the odds ratio of participants‘ expression 
of interpersonal emotions when describing their computer. Values on the Y-axis are 
odds-ratios relative to average participants in the control condition. Participants in the 
anthropomorphism condition filled out a personality questionnaire for their computer. 
Participants in the object condition rated their computer on non-anthropomorphic traits. 
Attachment anxiety was by evaluated at prescreening. Low and high values are plotted 
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Figure 8: Relationship between attachment anxiety and replacement intentions 
 
The relationship between attachment style and people‘s willingness to replace their 
computer. Participants in the anthropomorphism condition filled out a personality 
questionnaire for their computer. Participants in the object condition rated their computer 
on non-anthropomorphic traits. Attachment anxiety was by evaluated at prescreening. 






























Anthropomorphism and Emotional Response 
 
As suggested by Chapter 8, anthropomorphizing objects could lead to the 
experience of interpersonal emotions when thinking about them. This observation is 
supported by appraisal theories of emotion, which hold that emotional responses to 
situations are dictated by the combination of evaluations of the causes and outcomes of 
events. Appraisals of valence account for the majority of variance when predicting 
emotional response (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), reflecting that people almost always feel 
positive emotions in response to desired events and negative emotions in response to 
undesired events. However, other appraisals, including who was affected by the action, 
the level of certainty about the cause or outcome and the intentionality of the act (and 
thus, by implication, the presence of an agent) help differentiate affective experiences 
into discrete emotions.  
Positive emotions are not the best candidates to evaluate this hypothesis. Research 
on the relationship between appraisal dimensions and specific emotional responses has 
found that in general positive emotions tend to be diffuse and undifferentiated (Ellsworth 
& Smith, 1988a). Returning to the example of love, although in the strictest sense it is an 
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interpersonal emotion, it is often used interchangeably with other positive emotions. In 
contrast, negative emotions tend to be more discrete. Thus, while it would be acceptable 
to profess ―love‖ for a rainbow, it would be somewhat odd to express anger at a rain 
cloud. Appraisals show a similar pattern, tending to have a more complex and 
differentiated structure for negative rather than positive emotions (Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). This differentiation reflects the role of negative feelings as adaptive ―problem 
signals‖ that motivate an organism‘s response (Schwarz, 2010; Nesse, 1990) and suggests 
that negative emotions might provide a more convincing test of the role of 
anthropomorphic cues on emotional response.  
Although emotional experience is influenced by many different appraisal 
dimensions, appraisals of agency assume central importance in the discrimination 
between core negative emotions. In general, people feel guilty when they are the source 
of harm, angry when others are the source of harm and sad when events are not caused by 
any apparent agent as reflected by the appraisal patterns given by participants asked to 
recall events that elicited a particular emotion (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Other 
researchers using similar methods have reached generally the same conclusion, 
identifying perceptions of unfairness as an appraisal central to the experience of anger 
(Roseman, Weist & Swartz, 1994; Roseman, 1984). Unfairness is often implied in 
intentional harmful acts and unsurprisingly these ―dimensions‖ are correlated quite highly 
(Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b) suggesting that these reflect a common underlying construct.   
Converging evidence for the relationship between other-caused harm and anger 
comes from experiments that manipulate appraisal dimensions and investigate the 
subsequent effect on emotional response. Ellsworth and Smith (1988b) asked participants 
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to recall events that matched specific patterns of appraisal. They then asked participants 
to describe the event before measuring the specific appraisals they made about the 
situation (effectively a manipulation check) and the emotions they felt. They found that 
people reported feeling more anger and less guilt in response to negative events caused 
by others as compared to negative events caused by the self and more sadness when the 
negative outcome was a result of the situation rather than a specific human agent (see 
also Smith, Haynes, Lazarus & Pope, 1993; Neumann, 2000). Although most real life 
experiences elicit complex blends of emotional response with few one to one associations 
between specific appraisal patterns and specific emotions, diary studies have shown that 
the relationships between appraisal patterns and emotions observed in the laboratory 
remain stronger than relationships between theoretically unrelated constructs (Nezlek, 
Vansteelandt, VanMechelen & Kuppens, 2008; Goetz, Frenzel, Stoeger & Hall, 2010).  
Together these findings suggest that to the extent that anthropomorphic cues 
create the possibility than an object‘s ―actions‖ are intentional, they should also intensify 
the experience of emotions that are related to appraisals of other-agency when thinking 
about it. To test this, participants were primed to think of their vehicle in terms of either 
its psychological or physical characteristics. Following this induction, participants were 
asked to recall a time their vehicle failed them. It was predicted that priming agentic 
thoughts should lead people to perceive relatively more intent behind negative events and 
consequently experience more anger.  
Method 
135 participants were recruited from Mechanical Turk to complete the survey. 
Three dropped out and three did not agree to answer questions carefully and take the 
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survey seriously, leaving a total of 129. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions (anthropomorphism, object, and control) and told that the survey 
explored ―what people think about their cars.‖ Participants assigned to the 
anthropomorphism condition first rated their car on five bipolar scales anchored with 
personality traits (reserved – enthusiastic, quarrelsome – sympathetic, dependable – 
irresponsible, open to new experiences – uncreative, and anxious – calm), whereas 
participants assigned to the object condition rated physical attributes of their car (quiet – 
loud, unresponsive – responsive, unreliable – reliable, versatile – limited, shaky – 
smooth). 
Participants were then asked to ―think back to a time when something went wrong 
with your car. This could include something happening that was not supposed to happen 
or something not happening that was supposed to happen.‖ They were asked to picture 
this situation in their mind and describe in as much detail what went wrong and how the 
consequences affected them personally.  
After describing the event participants reported their emotional response by 
indicating the extent to which they felt 12 different emotions (see Appendix). Although 
frustration is sometimes conceived of as distinct from anger, it typically highly related to 
anger (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b) and in the sample 
participants did not appear to differentiate between these emotions. Thus, frustration was 
collapsed into a single measure of anger along with the two adjectives designed to 
measure anger (angry and resentful; α = .75). Participants also rated how they felt on 9 
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other adjectives (happy, relieved, surprised, interested, bored, guilty, afraid, sad and 
resigned).  
Participants then answered a number of questions designed to measure their 
appraisals of the situation. They rated the extent to which they thought the situation was 
pleasant, certain, predictable and effortful. To measure appraisals of responsibility they 
also rated the extent to which they felt the situation was under their personal control, 
under the control of others, caused by others, beyond anyone‘s control and the extent to 
which they felt cheated or wronged (see Appendix; adapted from Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). In previous research the last four items formed a single dimension of human 
agency composed of two subfactors - the extent to which the self caused the outcome 
(self-control and personal responsibility) and the extent to which another agent caused the 
outcome (perceptions of other control and feelings of being cheated). In this particular 
study these subscales had poor reliability (αs < .5) so they will be treated individually in 
subsequent analysis.   
Results  
Emotion. 
The key prediction is that anthropomorphic primes should make people feel more 
anger, but not differ in their experience of other negative emotions. A planned contrast 
(Rosenthal, et al. 2000) with negative emotions as within-subjects factors (weights: anger 
4, sad -1, resigned -1, afraid -1 and guilty -1) and condition as a between-subjects factor 
was significant, F(1,118) = 4.94, p < .03, ηp
2
 = .04.  
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A planned contrast examining the influence of the anthropomorphic prime on 
anger confirmed that participants reported feeling more anger when thinking of a time 
their car malfunctioned after rating its personality characteristic (M = 5.29, SD = 1.63) 
than after rating its technical characteristics (M = 4.46, SD = 1.90) or in the control 
condition (M = 3.93, SD = 2.12), F(1,120) = 10.71, p < .001, ηp
2
 =.08. In contrast, other 
negative emotions were unaffected, Fs < 1.   
Appraisals. 
Participants reported that their vehicle‘s malfunction was less pleasant after rating 
its personality characteristics (M = 1.64, SD = .89) than after rating its physical 
characteristics (M = 2.29, SD = 1.38) or in the control condition (M = 1.98, SD = 1.30), 
F(1,120) = 4.75, p < .04, ηp
2
 =.04. Participants also felt somewhat more ―cheated or 
wronged‖ after thinking about their vehicle in anthropomorphic terms (M = 3.54, SD = 
2.05) than after thinking about their vehicle in technical terms (M = 2.85, SD = 1.84) or in 
the control condition (M = 2.73, SD = 2.03), F(1,120) = 3.57, p < .05, ηp
2
 =.03. Finally, 
people felt a greater sense of responsibility for the malfunction after thinking about either 
technical (M = 2.74, SD = 2.27) or anthropomorphic (M = 3.09, SD = 1.89) features of 
their car felt a greater sense of responsibility for the malfunction than those in the control 
group (M = 2.02, SD = 1.40), F(1,119) = 4.00, p < .05, ηp
2
 =.03, suggesting that perhaps 
problems seem more obvious in hindsight following consideration of features that could 
contribute to it. 
Mediational Analysis.  
Priming consumers to think about their vehicle in anthropomorphic terms exerts a 
direct effect on both feelings of anger and perceptions of being cheated. A meditational 
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analysis using bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) revealed that the perception of 
being cheated was also related to feelings of anger, t(121) = 5.81, p  < .001. Furthermore, 
the indirect effect of anthropomorphic beliefs through perceptions of being cheated was 
significantly different from zero, with a point estimate of .26, and a 95% BCa (bias-
corrected and accelerated; see Efron, 1987) bootstrap confidence interval of .028 to .570 
indicating that the indirect effect was significantly different from zero. However, the 
direct effect of the anthropomorphic prime on feelings of anger remained significant, 
t(121) = 2.61, p = .01 indicating that mediation was only partial (Figure 9) 
 
Discussion  
In line with predictions, thinking of a vehicle‘s psychological features led 
participants to report feeling more anger after recalling a time when it failed them. Direct 
support for the appraisal process that predicted this outcome was somewhat more limited. 
The items designed to measure appraisals of other-agency had quite low reliability. 
However, feelings of being cheated or wronged partially mediated the influence of 
anthropomorphic beliefs on feelings of anger.  
One possible reason why feelings of being cheated differed by condition but 
appraisals of other-agency did not is that being ―cheated‖ captures both other-causality 
and a perception of unfairness and may thus may be closer to the core of appraisals 
related to anger (Roseman et al., 1994). However, this is unlikely as it does not explain 
why feelings of being cheated and other-agency are poorly correlated in this study but not 
in earlier research (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b).  
 
 70 
A more plausible explanation is that the perception of being cheated is a 
somewhat less direct measurement of intentionality that itself relies on a global feeling. 
In contrast, determining explicit other-causality requires a more careful and deliberate 
analysis of what happened. Although appraisals are assumed to be antecedent to 
emotional experience (Ellsworth, 1991; Schwarz, 2010), emotions can also evolve over 
time and initial appraisals can be modified by subsequent deliberative thought (for a 
discussion see Frijda, 1993). One characteristic that distinguishes deliberative thought 
from relatively automatic processes such as those assumed to occur in early stages of 
appraisal is that they can be rejected as false (Bodenhausen & Gawronski, 2006). To the 
extent that answering an explicit question about causality requires deliberative thought, it 
may provide an opportunity for people to revise their initial reactions. This could explain 
why the anthropomorphic prime affected the somewhat more intuitive perception of 
being cheated but not more direct appraisals of other-causality while also accounting for 
the relatively poor correlation between these questions.  
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Figure 9: Direct and indirect effects of anthropomorphic thoughts on feelings of anger 
Path values represent unstandardized regression coefficients. The values outside of the 
parentheses represent the direct effect of a variable without mediators. Value in 
parentheses represents the direct effect, from bootstrapping analyses, of 
anthropomorphism on feelings of anger after the mediators are included. *p < .05. **p < 








 Taken together, these findings show that attending to ―psychological‖ features of 
a product alters people‘s thoughts and feelings about objects. This (i) decouples interest 
in purchasing or retaining a product from instrumental considerations about the product. 
Consumers typically desire products that they have a use for, but for products that 
possess anthropomorphic cues desire is not predicted by need (Chapter Four). Likewise, 
when thinking about products that they already own, people‘s replacement intentions 
depended on the perceived quality of the product but this relationship vanished when 
anthropomorphic beliefs were primed (Chapters Five, Six and Seven).  
Instead, thinking about the ―psychological‖ features of a product (ii) leads people 
to attend to features that are valued in the interpersonal domain. People are more attracted 
to anthropomorphized products that have neonatal features (Chapter Four). Likewise, 
consumers who were induced to think of their car as ―warm‖ reported lower replacement 
intentions than consumers who were induced to see it as ―cold‖, but only under 
anthropomorphic thought conditions (Chapter Seven). In combination, these findings 
suggest that anthropomorphic thought shifts the information that consumers attend from 
features relevant to object cognition to features relevant to social cognition.  
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Additionally, (iii) although people did not prefer new products with 
anthropomorphic features (Chapter Four) they are (iv) generally reluctant to replace 
anthropomorphized products that they already own (Chapters Five, Six and Seven), 
especially if (v) they have an anxious interpersonal attachment style (Chapter Eight). 
Finally, the frequency of spontaneous use of the word ―love‖ by the anxiously attached 
participants in Chapter Eight suggests that (vi) interpersonally relevant emotions may 
drive people‘s reluctance to replace objects although normative considerations may also 
play a role. This interpretation is supported by a more direct test of the downstream 
emotional consequences of anthropomorphism (Chapter Nine) that demonstrates that 
agency leads people to feel more anger when a product fails them. This finding is 
consistent with appraisal theories of emotion, which predict anger in response to harmful 
acts caused by another agent.    
Note that these findings cannot be explained by assuming that the manipulation of 
anthropomorphic thought merely increased participants‘ positive regard towards objects. 
We observed no consistent difference in the positivity of participants‘ free-response 
descriptions of their cars. Some studies showed no effect of the anthropomorphic prime 
on overall positivity (Chapters Six and Seven) while in others, the influence of the 
anthropomorphic prime on replacement intentions occurs despite statistically controlling 
for overall positivity of descriptions on replacement intentions (Chapters Five and Eight). 
Even if observed, any increase in positive regard would merely predict decreased 
replacement intentions. This account, however, falls short of accounting for four other 
key findings. First, it provides no rationale for the decoupling of replacement intentions 
and product utility. Second, it fails to predict the increased impact of attributes valued in 
 
 74 
the interpersonal domain. Third, it fails to predict the influence of interpersonal 
attachment on replacement intentions for anthropomorphic objects. Fourth, it fails to 
predict that people would feel more anger when thinking about an anthropomorphized 
product that has failed them. In contrast, the assumption that anthropomorphic thought 
grounds object cognition in social cognition provides a parsimonious account of all 
findings. 
Taken together these findings suggest that consumers do not automatically and 
consistently anthropomorphize non-living products (as implied by correlational research, 
e.g. Aaker 1997; Moon & Nass 1996) but rather that they are sensitive to agentic cues. 
Further, by holding the target of judgment constant and manipulating only whether its 
features are construed in ―psychological‖ or ―physical‖ terms, these findings demonstrate 
that the categories of ―human‖ and ―nonhuman‖ have fundamentally different 
consequences for information processing, yet the category in which a target of judgment 
is included is malleable and depends not only on features of the target and perceiver but 
additional contextual cues that influence category accessibility and applicability.  
Implications 
Anthropomorphizing products may have beneficial as well as adverse 
consequences for both consumers and companies. On the one hand, the increased 
attachment resulting from anthropomorphizing a product (say a car) may lead consumers 
to invest more in maintaining it. If so, consumers may benefit from an increased life-span 
of their possessions and businesses from the services and products required for proper 
maintenance. On the other hand, anthropomorphizing a product reduces consumers‘ 
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willingness to replace it, as seen in the present studies. This may potentially increase 
consumers‘ maintenance cost beyond economically defensible levels while reducing 
producers‘ sales.  
Our findings further show that anthropomorphic cues can direct attention away 
from some features and towards others. This may allow marketers to increase the 
likelihood that desirable features are attended to, while decreasing the attention paid to 
undesirable features. But as previous research noted, this strategy may have 
consequences that are not always obvious. Anthropomorphic cues may turn an otherwise 
innocuous air intake grille into a welcoming smile or a threatening scowl or may allow an 
idiosyncratic collection of objects to become a family (Agarwal & McGill, 2007). 
Likewise, anthropomorphic cues may direct consumers‘ attention away from the physical 
quality of a product and towards other, less instrumental features, as observed in Study 2. 
This could hurt products of superior technical quality and benefit competitors with more 
appealing ―interpersonal‖ features. 
To the extent that anthropomorphic perceptions elicit corresponding relational 
expectations, consumers may also respond negatively when the product does not live up 
to them. For example, Agarwal (2004) found that people dislike products that imply a 
specific kind of interpersonal relationship style (e.g. a communal or exchange 
orientation) once they realize that the product does not live up to the norms associated 
with it. Similarly, anthropomorphic primes may make consumers feel angrier if an object 
cannot live up to its expectations.  
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Finally, the observation that anthropomorphic thought is easily elicited by asking 
for trait ratings raises a potentially important methodological concern for market research 
surveys. Stimulated by research into brand personality (Aaker, 1997), many applied 
market research surveys assess consumers‘ perceptions of a brand by asking for ratings 
that usually include a mix of anthropomorphic (e.g. ―honest‖) and non-anthropomorphic 
(e.g. ―rugged‖) traits. Our findings suggest that the anthropomorphic traits may foster 
anthropomorphized perceptions of the brand with downstream effects on intentions. If so, 
collecting ratings of agentic traits may introduce a previously unobserved source of 
systematic context effects in market research (Weaver & Schwarz, 2008), potentially 
undermining the predictive value of respondents‘ answers for consumers who were not 
first induced to think in anthropomorphic terms. Future research may fruitfully address 
this possibility. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although these studies improve upon previous research on anthropomorphism by 
adopting a method that allows the category a target belongs to be experimentally 
manipulated while its attributes are held constant and they identify novel effects of 
anthropomorphic primes, there are a number of limitations that future research could 
address. The method by which the accessibility of anthropomorphic thoughts is measured 
could be improved. Although the coding of free responses for the spontaneous use of 
anthropomorphic terms and positive feelings towards an object has its strengths – namely 
it provides a conservative test of anthropomorphic belief that is less susceptible to 
demand characteristics – it is a relatively coarse measure of these constructs. This is 
especially true for the accessibility of anthropomorphic terms, which is not only a 
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dichotomous measure but also may be influenced by normative or conversational 
conventions that inhibit the expression of anthropomorphic thought. Future research 
investigating whether these beliefs - and more specifically what kinds of agentic beliefs – 
influence different downstream decisions about objects could benefit from the use of 
more sensitive measurements.  
Second, the extent to which these effects occur automatically or as the result of 
more deliberative processes remains an open question. Subtle primes have a somewhat 
greater influence on replacement intentions (Chapters Six and Seven) than more blatant 
primes (Chapter Four) and anthropomorphic cues influence a relatively indirect measure 
of other-agency (perceptions of being cheated) but not a direct attribution of other-agency 
(Chapter Nine).  This is consistent with more general research on priming that finds that 
people will correct their judgments when they believe to have been subject to undue 
influence and have a theory about how to correct this bias (Martin, 1986; for recent 
reviews see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006l Schwarz & Bless, 2010).  
At the same time, at least some downstream consequences of anthropomorphic 
thought (e.g. detecting threatening agents) should be relatively automatic and thus 
unaffected by the negation of these primes. For example, other research has shown that 
even people who do not believe in ghosts behave more pro-socially when told a room is 
―haunted‖ (Bering McLeod & Shackleford, 2005). Future research could also explore 
whether social processes that are automatic are similarly influenced by anthropomorphic 
primes as these should be far easier to influence. Likewise, exploring the relationship 
between individual differences and the processing of anthropomorphic primes through 
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automatic or propositional pathways could also provide a clearer picture of who is 





Materials used in Chapter Nine 
To what extent do the following adjectives describe how you felt while you were actually 
experiencing the situation? 
Happy 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Resentful 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Bored 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Relieved 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Angry 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Confident 
Ο О О О О О О 





Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Interested 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Resigned 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Hopeful 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Frustrated 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Guilty 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Sad 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Very much so 
 
Afraid 
Ο О О О О О О 




The following questions are about how you interpreted the situation you just described. 
As you answer each question, think back to how you understood the situation. 
How pleasant or unpleasant was it to be in this situation? 
Ο О О О О О О 
Very unpleasant      Very pleasant 
 
How well did you understand what was happening in the situation? 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Extremely 
 
How uncertain were you about what was happening in the situation? 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Extremely 
 
How well could you predict what was going to happen in this situation?  
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Extremely 
 
In this situation, to what extent did you feel cheated or wronged? 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Extremely 
 
To what extent did you feel that circumstances beyond anyone's control were happening 
in the situation? 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Extremely 
 
To what extent did you feel that you had the ability to influence what was happening in 
this situation? 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Extremely 
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To what extent did you feel that someone other than yourself was controlling what 
happened in this situation? 
Ο О О О О О О 
Not at all      Extremely 
 
To what extent did you feel this situation required you to expend effort? 
Ο О О О О О О 
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